Potomac Analytics' Logo

Broker Disclosure Download

We consolidate the SEC's Investment Adviser data and FINRA's BrokerCheck data into simple reports covering all available public disclosures involving brokers and investment advisers for industrial researchers and members of academia to download. We provide the raw public disclosures as they appear on SEC and FINRA websites.

Potomac Data Analytics, LLC is not associated with SEC or FINRA.


Broker Disclosure Literature

Craig McCann, Chuan Qin, and Mike Yan. Apr 2016. "How Widespread and Predictable is Stock Broker Misconduct?" Journal of Index Investing, Summer 2017, Vol. 26, Issue 2, pp. 6-25.

Craig McCann, Chuan Qin and Mike Yan. Aug 2017. "Rating Brokerage Firms by Their Complaint Histories Rather Than by Their Brokers' Histories"

Egan, Mark, Gregor Matvos, and Amit Seru. 2019. “The Market for Financial Adviser Misconduct.” Journal of Political Economy 127 (1): 233-95.

Charoenwong, Ben, Alan Kwan, and Tarik Umar. 2019. “Does Regulatory Jurisdiction Affect the Quality of Investment-Adviser Regulation?” American Economic Review 109 (10): 3681-3712.

Law, Kelvin KF, and Luo Zuo. 2021. "How does the economy shape the financial advisory profession?." Management Science 67 (4): 2466-2482.

Honigsberg, Colleen, and Matthew Jacob. 2021. “Deleting Misconduct: The Expungement of BrokerCheck Records.” Journal of Financial Economics 139 (3): 800-831.

Gelman, Michael, Zaheer Khan, Amir Shoham, and Shlomo Y. Tarba. 2021. "Does local competition and firm market power affect investment adviser misconduct?." Journal of Corporate Finance 66: 101810.

Dimmock, Stephen G., William C. Gerken, and Tyson Van Alfen. 2021. "Real estate shocks and financial advisor misconduct." The Journal of Finance 76 (6): 3309-3346.

Egan, Mark, Shan Ge, and Johnny Tang. 2022. “Conflicting Interests and the Effect of Fiduciary Duty: Evidence from Variable Annuities.” The Review of Financial Studies 35 (12): 5334-86.

Egan, Mark, Gregor Matvos, and Amit Seru. 2022. "When Harry fired Sally: The double standard in punishing misconduct." Journal of Political Economy 130 (5): 1184-1248.